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Executive Summary and Key Points 
 
The subject of traditional authority in Africa seems to have neglected until very 
recently, except in historical studies, despite the fact that traditional leaders 
have played and continue to play a very important role in many African 
countries. There has been increased interest in chieftaincy since the mid-
1990s, most likely as a result of decentralisation programmes in Africa, 
although the majority of studies currently seem to be either cross-country 
analysis or more advanced in a few countries (South Africa and Ghana in 
particular). As countries and donors become more interested in local 
government, it has become obvious that little is known about the relationship 
between local authorities and traditional authorities, and more analysis is 
needed. The literature included in this annotated bibliography represents the 
first stage in understanding the often very complicated relationship between 
different sources of power at the local level.  
 
A number of key points have come out of this work: 
 
• A starting point should be in finding out exactly how local people feel about 
traditional leadership in general and their leaders in particular. If they are 
supportive of both, it is important to include leaders in plans for local 
government. If local people do not support their traditional leaders, they 
should not be forced upon them. 
 
• Traditional authorities and local government claim legitimacy and authority 
based on entirely different factors. Local government claims authority 
based on democracy and constitutional legality, much of which is inherited 
from the colonial period, despite the fact that colonialism itself was anti-
democratic. Traditional leaders claim legitimacy based on history and 
religion. Historically, traditional leaders claim political authority derived 
from the pre-colonial period. They are seen to represent ‘indigenous, truly 
African values and authority’. Religiously, they claim links to the divine, 
whether a god, a spirit or the ancestors.  
 
• If traditional authorities are to have a role in providing services alongside 
local government, there must be cooperation between the two. The South 
Africans have a saying for this – ‘two bulls in a kraal’. Both actors want to 
have the lead role, leading inevitably to deadlock and conflict. Roles must 
be well defined and agreed upon, and the public must understand which is 
responsible for what. 
 
• Performance matters! Support for traditional leaders tends to be higher in 
places where service delivery is poor and then decreases in places where 
the local government is seen to be doing a good job.  
 
• In many cases, traditional authorities can be a positive force for 
development, providing a bridge between civil society and the government. 
In other cases, traditional authorities can be corrupt, violent or criminal. It is 
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important to look at how leaders have behaved in the past to see how they 
are like to perform in the future.  
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Annotated Bibliography  
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General: Chieftaincy in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
C. Katiza, ‘Going in to the 21st Century: Decentralization, 
Democratization and Empowerment at the Local Level’, Paper 
presented at the Colloquium on ‘The Commonwealth in the 
Third Millennium’, Ottawa, 20-22 February 1998, 7pp, available 
at http://www.rcscanada.org/colloquium/Katiza.doc. 
 
This paper only mentions chieftainship in passing, but is of interest 
nonetheless as the speaker is the Secretary General of the International 
Union of Local Authorities – Africa Section. He sets out why decentralisation, 
as opposed to deconcentration, is an important policy issue for the 
Commonwealth and sets out areas for focus including finance, capacity 
building, integrity systems and entrenchment of local authorities in national 
constitutions. 
 
 
D.I. Ray, ‘Traditional Leadership and Local Government: 
Some Policy Questions for Consideration’, Paper presented at 
the Symposium on Traditional Leadership and Local 
Government, Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 
Gaborone, Botswana, 23-26 September 1997, 12pp, available 
at http://www.ucalgary.ca/UofC/faculties/SS/POLI/RUPP/taarn/ 
page4ai.html. 
 
In many countries, traditional leaders already have legitimacy that precedes 
the current post-colonial state, based on different bases of political legitimacy. 
For Ray, legitimacy = the reasons why people obey authority. Force, for 
example, may be one reason, but it lacks legitimacy and usually fails in the 
long-term. Instead, a form of authority has legitimacy when people obey its 
laws because they are convinced that they should do so willingly and are in 
agreement as to how they should be ruled.  
 
The contemporary state in Africa bases its legitimacy on two main sources: 
democracy and constitutional legality. Much of this is inherited from the 
colonial period, despite the fact that colonialism itself was anti-democratic. 
Because of different political cultures, historical trajectories and colonial 
influences, the form and content of these may look different in different 
countries, but the two sources remain the same. 
 
Traditional leaders also have two main sources of legitimacy, both very 
different from the secular sources for the state: historical and religious. 
Historically, traditional leaders claim political authority derived from the pre-
colonial period. They are seen to represent ‘indigenous, truly African values 
and authority’. Religiously, they claim links to the divine, whether a god, a 
spirit or the ancestors.  
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Ray explains that it’s important that legitimacy is not seen as a ‘zero-sum 
game’, and that although very different, these forms of legitimacy can 
combine to form a powerful authority that is able to achieve high levels of both 
development and democratisation. Without cooperation, resources are likely 
to be pulled in different directions with little effectiveness. In either case, both 
forms of authority require the consent of the people. If local government does 
not have the support of the people, it should not be forced upon them, and nor 
should traditional leadership if it does not have support. It is important to find 
out the real will of the people. 
 
The paper suggests various ways these authorities can cooperate: 
 
1. Legislative/Executive Bodies 
 
a. Reserved seats for traditional leaders 
 
i. By appointment 
ii. Elected by fellow traditional leaders 
iii. Regular elections 
iv. Variation of the above 
 
2. Administrative/Supervisory Bodies 
 
a. Reserved seats for traditional leaders 
 
3. Advisory Bodies 
 
a. Joint committees of local government and traditional leaders 
 
4. Local Governance: what traditional leaders could do 
 
a. Informal involvement of traditional leaders 
b. More formal involvement 
c. Mobilisation of customary values 
d. Traditional leader-organised development 
e. Mobilise customary values in and of civic education and 
elections 
f. Traditional discussion meetings 
g. Resolve customary disputes (resort where necessary to joint 
traditional-state bodies such as houses of chiefs) 
h. Creation of networks of traditional leaders, officials and 
researchers such as the Traditional Authority Applied 
Research Network (TAARN)1 
 
 
D.I. Ray, K. Sharma & I.I. May-Parker (eds), Symposium on 
Traditional Leadership and Local Government, 
Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Gaborone, 
1 See http://www.ucalgary.ca/UofC/faculties/SS/POLI/RUPP/taarn/. 
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Botswana, 23-26 September 1997, 49pp, available at 
http://www.ucalgary.ca/UofC/faculties/SS/POLI/RUPP/taarn/pa
ge4ai.html. 
 
This symposium brought together over fifty traditional leaders, mayors, senior 
local and government officials and academics from twelve African countries: 
Botswana, the Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as the UK 
and Canada (Nigeria and Sierra Leone would’ve been included but both had 
been suspended by the Commonwealth). General consensus among 
participants prior to the symposium was that traditional leaders should have 
an active role in local government in their countries but the nature of this role 
needed debate. 
 
The participants recommend the following broad principles: 
 
• a reconfirmation of support for ‘effective, elected local government 
was an important foundation of democracy’; 
 
• constitutional and administrative frameworks should ensure the 
participation of all stakeholders in local governance; 
 
 
• recognition of the role of traditional leadership and, where 
appropriate, incorporated into the constitution; 
 
• traditional leaders and local government should cooperate for 
development. 
 
In addition, participant issued recommendations on service delivery, social 
change and transformation, governance and land and judicial functions. 
 
The governance recommendations, in particular, highlight the complexity of 
the traditional-local government relationship. It firstly recognises the legitimacy 
that traditional leaders continue to have and the power this gives them to 
mobilise local populations behind development initiatives. However, the 
Symposium recommends that traditional leaders face the same requirements 
of transparency and accountability that local government faces, that leaders 
stay away from partisan politics and that their role within local government be 
advisory or consultative. 
 
All of the countries (and Sierra Leone in absentia) presented an overview of 
the historical and current relationship between traditional leaders and local 
government. Although brief, these provide a good outline of the current 
scenario in each country. 
 
 
D.I. Ray & E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, ‘The New 
Relevance of Traditional Authorities in Africa: The 
 8 
Conference; Major Themes; Reflections of Chieftaincy in 
Africa; Future Directions’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law: Special Issue on The New Relevance of 
Traditional Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37-38, 1996, 38pp, 
pp. 1-38. 
 
This paper introduces a special issue of the Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, based on the Conference on the Contribution of Traditional 
Authority to Development, Democracy, Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection: Strategies for Africa. The conference concluded that the 
relationship between the state (at the national and local levels) and civil 
society in Africa is often disjointed and traditional leaders can act as a bridge 
between the two; however, the relationship between these three actors is 
often ‘unrecognised, ignored or misunderstood’.  
 
Besides setting out clearly the agenda of the conference and an overview of 
key issues in the papers included in this special issue, the paper concludes 
with suggested areas for future work: 
 
• the need to look at how chiefs have been able to mobilise the 
grassroots for support for developmental and democratic projects; 
 
• the impact of migration (both rural-urban and rural-rural) on 
legitimacy of local chiefs, when a number of their ‘subjects’ owe no 
allegiance to them; 
 
• the increased importance of developing concepts of the state, 
government, administration, sovereignty and legitimacy that both 
apply to and are the product of the realities of Africa; 
 
• and finally, a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
traditional leaders and development NGOs, both foreign and 
domestic. 
 
 
K. Sharma, ‘Mechanisms for Involvement of Traditional 
Leaders in the Promotion of Good Governance’, Paper 
presented at the Symposium on Traditional Leadership and 
Local Government, Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 
Gaborone, Botswana, 23-26 September 1997, 4pp, available at 
http://www.ucalgary.ca/UofC/faculties/SS/POLI/RUPP/taarn/pa
ge4ai.html. 
 
In 1995, the Commonwealth Local Government Forum commissioned a piece 
of research on the role of traditional leaders. This paper outlines how this 
research saw the role of traditional leaders in the promotion of good 
governance. Six areas are covered: constitutional and legal provision; land 
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allocation, land tenure and dispute settlement; development and service 
delivery; social and cultural change; the relationship with central and local 
government; the relationship with civic and community based organisations; 
and finally, training, conditions of service and facilities. 
 
Highlights include: 
 
• formal recognition of traditional chieftainship; 
 
• recognition and honour of traditional chiefs through advisory bodies 
like the House of Chiefs should be encouraged to protect local 
customs; 
 
• involve chiefs in local government through election, nomination or 
ex-officio status; 
 
• using chiefs to impart customary justice (‘The people in rural areas 
find the proceedings of customary courts simpler, cheaper and 
comprehensible’.); 
 
• consultation between chiefs and local government about the 
allocation of land and its use; 
 
• using chiefs to mobilise local support for development plans; 
 
• using chiefs to provide advice on use of traditions of communal 
provision of services; 
 
• using chiefs to provide communication between local people and 
government; 
 
• joint provision of civic and community education programmes; 
 
• provide social cohesion and maintain traditional values, reducing 
juvenile delinquency and crime. 
 
 
P. Skalník, ‘Authority versus Power: Democracy in Africa 
Must Include Original African Institutions’, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law: Special Issue on The New 
Relevance of Traditional Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37-38, 
1996, 12pp, pp. 109-121. 
 
This paper is by and large a detailed anthropological report on the Nanun 
chieftaincy in northeastern Ghana. However, in the introduction and 
conclusion it raises important points. Firstly, it is important to remember that 
virtually all studies on traditional authorities in Africa see the institutions 
through a ‘Western lens’. This impacts our understanding and leads to 
 10 
scholars seeing a dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. The reality is 
much more complex. Secondly, he re-emphasises the difference between 
direct and representative democracy. If someone has a complaint and brings 
it to his local councillor, it may not be possible for that person to bring the 
complaint to those with the power to address it.  If s/he brings it to the chief, 
the chief can go directly to the head of state if necessary. 
 
 
E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, ‘States and Chiefs: Are 
Chiefs Mere Puppets?’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law: Special Issue on The New Relevance of 
Traditional Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37-38, 1996, 39pp, 
pp. 39-78. 
 
To some observers, chiefs have been seen as an anachronism, a throwback 
to pre-colonial days, pre-modern days; however, chiefs have proven 
remarkably adaptable and continue ‘to play a crucial role in future social, 
economic and cultural transformations at regional and national levels’.  
 
Colonial governments changed the nature of chieftaincy by giving them 
specific administrative responsibilities, incorporating them into the modern 
ruling apparatus and, hence, politicising them. In the post-colonial era, this 
has also been the strategy of many democratic, autocratic, military and one-
party states. As chiefs have become, in many cases, glorified local officials or 
civil servants, the author argues that their traditional role has become 
‘folklorization’: using the traditional legitimacy and symbols of the chiefs to add 
to the legitimacy of the state. He becomes subsumed into the local 
government machine, losing his power and also his special role as 
intermediary between the people and the government. He risks becoming 
merely a ‘tourist guide…for safaris.’ 
 
This dual role, as speaker for both the people and the local government, can 
strengthen both a new local council, lacking legitimacy, and a politically 
illiterate people, as long as the goals of both coincide. If there is conflict, the 
chief finds himself trying to appease both parties, eventually weakening his 
position with both. 
 
The problem is that the state should not need to enhance itself by usurping or 
borrowing the chiefs’ legitimacy. However, the modern African state has lost 
the trust and good will of its people. Because democracy has yet to bring 
about an increase in trust and legitimacy, governments often find that ‘[a] 
good relationship with chiefs who are the representatives of that other 
traditional, moral and political order is conducive to the legitimacy of the 
[government]’. However, it is important to ask if the government intends this 
as a short-term solution to a short-term problem, or does it really intend to 
fully integrate traditional authorities into the governing of the state? If it is seen 
only as a short-term arrangement, one must remember the adaptability and 
longevity of traditional authority. Also, powerful chiefs may be unwilling to 
simply step aside to let an effective, modern, democratic government take 
 11 
over. The author provides the following description of the Ooni of Ifé in Nigeria 
to illustrate this point: ‘He is the descendant of Ododua, the god…He is the 
undisputed leader to 15 million Yorubas and the representative of God on 
earth…[He is unlikely to let] himself become a tool of the state.’ 
 
In the 1980s in Zimbabwe, the government was unable to control street 
violence following the conflict with Uganda. It allowed the rise of sungusungu, 
or vigilante groups organised by traditional leaders, who helped establish law 
and order. Although the state had lost its monopoly on violence (one of the 
keys to state sovereignty), it viewed the groups positively, ‘as a successful 
alternative to the state judicial organisation’. However, Mugabe has used 
these same groups very successfully in recent years to intimidate and even 
kill the opposition, much to many Zimbabweans and the international 
community’s dismay. This illustrates the need for caution when perceiving the 
use of traditional authority as a short-term solution. 
 
 
T. von Trotha, ‘From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy: Some 
Problems and Prospects of African Chieftaincy’, Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law: Special Issue on The New 
Relevance of Traditional Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37-38, 
1996, 28pp, pp. 79-107. 
 
This article focuses on the way that the relationship between the chief and the 
colonial and post-colonial state has evolved into one where the chief acts as 
an intermediary between the state and the people, which the author refers to 
as ‘intermediary domination’. This reflects an antagonistic relationship 
between the state and the people. The use of the chief in this way reflects ‘the 
limits of state power to organise directly…They are a sign of the fundamental 
weakness of the colonial and postcolonial state. They are an indication of a 
lack of “organisational power” of the state’.  
 
Before suggesting ‘principles’ for the future development of African 
chieftaincy, von Trotha addresses two key assumptions. First, although he 
speaks in terms of the ‘state’, his state doesn’t have a monopoly on the use of 
violence. Secondly, it is not possible to reform the institutions of traditional 
authority without also addressing problems within the institutions of the state. 
If checks and balances are needed on chiefs’ power, chances are they are 
also needed on the power of government officials and politicians.  
 
Von Trotha’s principles: 
 
• The principles of local justice and local autonomy 
 
‘The chief and his court should be made an official institution of the legal 
system…[with]independence …guaranteed to the chief in his legal role and to 
the members of the chief’s court’’ 
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‘The principle of local autonomy entails leaving the solution of local problems 
to members of the local order…the members of the local orders should take 
responsibility for their proper concerns and interests and become agents in 
the process of societal change.’ 
 
• The principle of legal competition and urban settings 
 
Although chiefs may seem like a rural phenomenon, requiring a homogenous 
local population, patterns of migration into urban areas often reflect certain 
classes, ethnic affiliations and place of origin, leading to relatively 
homogenous neighbourhoods. The ‘chef de quartier’ can act as advisor, 
mediator and judge in neighbourhood conflicts, with the chiefs’ courts having 
the same status and liability as state courts. 
 
• The principles of agency and competence 
 
As agents of both tradition and change, it is vital that chiefs’ competencies 
meet the economic, administrative and political needs of today. 
 
• The principle of ‘civil chieftaincy’ 
 
When people say the chief ‘represents’ his people, it is not meant in the 
Western tradition of representation, based on universal suffrage, free 
elections, secret ballot and so on. It is instead ‘grounded on a social and 
moral idea of representation’. It is based on ‘communitarian forms of social 
relationships…the unity of sacred traditions and common religious 
beliefs…the construction of a common history…and the unity which 
domination demands’.  
 
The chief is where local debate is focused, where conflicting opinions and 
ideas can be voiced. It is direct democracy, as opposed to representative 
democracy. 
 
• The principle of legislative integration of chieftaincy 
 
Chieftaincy requires constitutional rights and responsibilities, ensuring that 
local interests are expressed at the national level. 
 
• The principle of limitation of the national power of chiefs 
 
Once again, checks and balances are required to protect the people against 
an abuse of power by chiefs, as it is to protect against the state. This is 
probably the most difficult of all the principles to implement in reality. If there is 
corruption and a lack of accountability at the state level and a political culture 
of the ‘politics of the belly’, then it is likely that the chiefs will reflect this as 
well. 
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Country Case Studies 
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Ghana 
 
C. Lentz, ‘”Chieftaincy has come to stay”: la chefferie dans 
les sociétés acéphales du Nord-Ouest Ghana’ [‘Chieftaincy 
has come to stay’: chieftaincy in the acephalous societies of 
North Western Ghana], Cahiers d’études africaines, Vol.XL, 
No.159, 2000 
 
This paper looks at the reasons for the survival of chieftaincy regimes after 
the end of colonial rule and their current role. The paper concentrates on one 
specific role, that of mediation between the colonial authorities and local 
communities at a low level (village, hamlet, household). After decolonisation 
the institution of chieftaincy remained the only viable intermediary between 
these local communities and the post-colonial state. 
 
Colonial administrative boundaries, without exception in this region, paralleled 
local chiefs domains, an elite strategy that was reinforced by the colonial 
practice of targeting the education of chiefs’ sons. Post-colonial Ghana has 
tended to continue this practice, and the several local disputes involved in 
succession are testament to the continued importance of this role, particularly 
in acting as a springboard into national politics. 
 
The system existed pretty much the same until the 1980s and into the 1990s 
when the policies of Rawlings expanded the educated base of the country, as 
well as forming a plethora of youth organisations allowing for the progression 
of non-chief youth to the more populist politics of 1990s Ghana. Despite this 
widening of the educated elite, chiefs remain powerful at local level, 
particularly in more remote or rural areas. 
 
 
R. Rathbone, ‘Native Courts, Local Courts, Chieftaincy and 
the CPP in Ghana in the 1950s’, Journal of African Cultural 
Studies, 13(1), 2000, 15pp, pp. 125-139. 
 
This article highlights the chiefs’ role in Ghana as arbitrars of customary 
justice, as well as the political and economic costs to the government of 
opposing this system. In Ghana during this time, the majority of cases heard 
were in customary courts, with the British reserving control over major crimes 
such as murder and arson. These Native Courts were extremely inexpensive 
to run and most of the chiefs did not earn a stipendiary for their time. They 
also were in charge of much of the ‘everyday’ regulation, including land 
allocation, confiscation, taxation, rights to cultivate, and so on.  However, this 
lack of stipend is said to have led to arbitrary judgements and even trumped-
up charges so that chiefs were able to collect fines and bribes.  
 
Although inexpensive, several reports commissioned during this time showed 
the system to be largely unjust and arbitrary. Recommendations included a 
complete overall of the system, modernising it and removing the Native 
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Courts. The British were unable to do this in the political climate at that time, 
where any attempt to change traditional ways of doing things was attacked. 
Also, the cost of a complete overall of the justice system proved too 
expensive in the inter-war and war period. There was also a real paucity of 
trained lawyers and judges and training enough to man a modern legal 
system only added to the escalating financial estimates. 
 
When the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP), headed by Nkrumah, came into 
power, they too sought to reform the judicial system. Effectiveness, fairness 
and efficiency were a concern, but the CPP also wanted to destroy the chiefs 
in general and recognised that taking away the Native Courts took away the 
majority of their power.  The CPP also believed that as it had come to power 
democratically, it had legitimacy that the chiefs lacked. However, the CPP 
found the same financial constraints, as had the British, and completely 
overhauling the system because less attractive. Instead, the Minister of Local 
Government decided to use Variation Orders to remove many chiefs from the 
Native Courts and replaced them with non-chiefs, often chosen from the 
party’s ranks. He was able to do this legally and without resorting to new 
legislation that would’ve required debate in the legislature. The CPP managed 
to gain considerable control over the chiefs through this system, as chiefs 
loyal to the CPP could be reinstated to the Native Courts. This ‘politicisation’ 
of the chiefs was to prove problematic for the CPP when the National 
Liberation Movement began. Instead of a weakened or destroyed chieftaincy 
system, the chiefs were able to play the parties and players off of each other 
for their own gain. 
 
 
R. Rathbone, Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of 
Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951-60, London: James Currey, 2000. 
 
This book builds on the research presented in the above article and is 
particularly important for the attention paid to the relationship between the 
chiefs and the political parties.  The first Minister for Local Government under 
the CPP explained early in 1951 that the new party wanted to retain the 
‘traditional relationship between chiefs and their people’ while at the same 
time putting together new local councils that would be ‘efficient, modern and 
democratic bodies and to have an origin and existence wholly distinct from the 
traditional councils’.  
 
As the story unfolds it becomes clear that the CPP was never able to find a 
balance between these two objectives and probably never intended to do so. 
The CPP wanted to destroy the old traditional councils but found that they 
were too powerful and still had a great deal of loyal followers (at least in some 
if not all areas). There seems to be two main reasons for this: (1) the 
traditional councils went against everything the party believed in terms of 
progress and democracy, and (2) the party did not want to share power with 
anyone else, least of all the chiefs. Things became messy when the 
government tried to simply fit new councils alongside traditional councils, 
which simply ignited both old and new political rivalries. More problems 
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emerged when chiefs couldn’t become accustomed to new ways of doing 
things or when elected local officials tried to aggressively assert their 
authority.  
 
With the rise of the NRM, this relationship became even more complicated. 
The outgoing colonial government was hostile to Nkrumah and the CPP, 
which it believed was aligned with Moscow, and this strengthened the NLM. 
Chiefs found themselves caught up in this battle for power, and while some 
were able to use it to their benefit, others simply became victims, either being 
forced to publicly choose sides or even by becoming caught up in the 
outbreaks of violence that seemed to dominate local politics.  
 
One the one hand, one can argue, as did some contemporaries, that 
restricting traditional leaders from participating in party politics would’ve 
helped alleviate this problem. However, another lesson could be drawn: avoid 
turning local politics into a battleground for national political parties, 
regardless of whether the actors involved are democratically elected local 
councils or traditional leaders. 
 
Beyond this, the new government never found the right balance between 
traditional and local councils, partly because it never seemed to have any 
intention to do so in the first place. When, by the mid-1950s, the CPP 
launched an all out offensive against the chiefs, it added to people’s view of 
them as authoritarian, losing them popular support, and raised levels of 
support for chiefs. As Rathbone points out in his conclusion, the fact that 
chiefs in Ghana survived this period of history and have remained a strong 
political force should not be forgotten. 
 
 
D.I. Ray, ‘Divided Sovereignty: Traditional Authority and the 
State in Ghana’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law: Special Issue on The New Relevance of Traditional 
Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37-38, 1996, 19pp, pp. 181-202. 
 
Sovereignty has long been considered an essential feature for a functioning 
state, and the role of chiefs raises questions both about their compatibility with 
the state system and the usefulness of largely Western concepts of 
sovereignty for the African context. Sovereignty, as we understand it is 
located at the highest political level, is the final power and is independent 
(although subject to interaction with other actors/influences). However, the 
1992 Ghanaian Constitutions gives some power to the National House of 
Chiefs that is not subject to the state: in other words, in certain matters, the 
chiefs are sovereign, not the state. 
 
One way to look at it is to see sovereignty based on legitimacy. Because the 
state and the chiefs have different bases for legitimacy (secular vs. religious, 
democratic vs. pre-colonial), it makes sense that the state should be 
sovereign in the affairs in which it has legitimacy and likewise for chiefs. 
Problems arise only when one crosses over into an area in which it lacks 
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legitimacy: for example, when the state tries to determine who becomes chief 
or when chiefs become involved in party politics.  
 
Each also has to be responsible for their own domain in order for that 
sovereignty to be respected. Ray gives the example of the tribal violence that 
took place between December 1993 and August 1994. Many people were 
killed, including some chiefs, largely over traditional territory disputes and 
leadership battles. President Rawlings was forced to call a State of 
Emergency and send in the Ghanaian army to stop the violence. He criticised 
the chiefs for being a source of violence rather than the source of peace. It 
was made clear that the chiefs had a responsibility to look after the areas in 
which they are considered sovereign, including security within their own 
territory.  
 
 
S.Tonah, ‘Fulani herdsmen, indigenous farmers and the 
contest for land in northern Ghana’, Afrika Spectrum, Vol.37, 
No.1, 2002 
 
This paper highlights one of the main issues of controversy between formal 
legal frameworks and traditional systems within Ghana. It essentially deals 
with the system through which the Fulani pastoralists and the indigenous 
farming population resolve disputes over land tenure and usage. In particular, 
it focuses on the deteriorating relationship between the herdsmen and farmers 
caused by the destruction of crops by livestock, and also the loss of cattle to 
rustlers. The relationship is further intensified by competition over the most 
fertile land along the banks of the Volta Lake. 
The increasing tension between the farmers and pastoralists has led to the 
intervention of national and local authorities to maintain law and order and to 
keep the pastoralists out of the farming area. However, local authorities have 
used the dispute to usurp the powers of the traditional leadership and chiefs 
who continue to rent out land to the Fulani. They have also threatened to 
prosecute chiefs who rent out land in this way, setting the scene for a 
protracted dispute between local government and traditional leaders. 
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Mozambique 
 
‘Marena’ Research Project, DFID, various briefing notes, 
University of Sussex 
 
The Marena research project is currently looking at issues relating to 
conservation and natural resource management in Manica, in rural 
Mozambique. It has an interest in chiefs and traditional leadership due to the 
importance of traditional leadership systems for mobilising local support. 
 
The role of the traditional leaders has been in flux in post-colonial 
Mozambique. After independence the formal systems of chieftaincy were 
abolished by the government, causing considerable resentment amongst local 
communities. By the end of the civil war, the view had altered and the 
government reconsidered its decision, finally deciding to work with, rather 
than against, chiefs. 
 
Manica was one area subject to Renamo control during the civil war, and a 
deliberate strategy of the rebels was to install local chiefs into areas they 
controlled. This provided local logistical support but also much needed 
legitimacy in rural areas. Since the end of the civil war, Renamo (now the 
opposition) have continued to support these institutions and the government 
has come around to this view. 
 
One Briefing Paper (MZ02) for the project relates an interesting case of the 
government project working with local leaders, and one in particular, which 
has been difficult. The main issue has been legitimacy. This particular chief 
has suffered from early in his reign from a legitimacy problem. The true 
successor fled and so his brother was installed. He appointed his own 
subordinates, which in turn led to distrust amongst groups of the population. 
The project first had difficulties in meeting the chief, who insisted on them 
meeting the spiritual advisor. This was then complicated by the projects 
attempts at participation, where the local population did not like the idea of a 
committee and consequently refer decisions to the chief. The chiefs 
association with a government project have also made it difficult for him, since 
his opponents claim he is accepting bribes from the government. At the same 
time, the government see him as being ‘difficult’. The role of intermediary has 
not been easy. 
 
Key points raised are: 
 
• Traditional leaders often command respect and may be a more 
legitimate source of government at a local level, but the complex 
history of chieftaincy and the alliances built up by chiefs may weaken 
authority, thus developing problems for projects and organisations 
trying to work through traditional structures 
• Working with traditional structures cannot instantly cleanse a history of 
conflict between rural people and government. 
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• Co-operation of chiefs may be as much about consolidation of their 
won positions as about the well being of their communities or natural 
resources. 
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Nigeria 
 
C. Ifeka, ‘Conflict, Complicity & Confusion: Unravelling 
Empowerment Struggles in Nigeria After the Return to 
“Democracy”’, Review of African Political Economy, 27(83), 
2000, 9pp, pp. 115-123. 
 
This article looks at the rise of militant groups of youth, particularly in the Delta 
Region, and their conflictual and ambiguous relationships with traditional 
chiefs. Youths, often well-educated and unemployed, struggle for ‘real’ 
democracy by attacking large NGOs, police, militia and oil companies. In this 
struggle, chiefs can be both victims and accomplices. 
 
The role of chiefs in Nigeria is very complex, largely because in the past, 
‘military regimes have co-opted traditional rulers and rendered them complicit 
in looting public revenues for private gain…Consequently, “elders” have lost 
esteem and authority’.2 Youths either use or abuse chiefs, depending on their 
own needs, and often seek to overthrow the traditional elder/youth 
relationship. Chiefs have come under attack and have even been killed. In 
other instances, chiefs have worked as middlemen between local government 
and young vigilante groups, taking ‘brown envelopes’ from government and 
passing on somewhat smaller ‘brown envelopes’ to the groups. As Ifeka 
points out, ‘Complicity between some youth and some elders implies that 
traditional rulers – representatives of the ancestors, guardians of their clan 
and ethnic group’s ritual regalia and sacred sites – have lost, or are fast losing 
their status and social distance from junior males, as the latter acquire 
increasing influence and political power through control of well-armed 
grassroots vigilante groups. This lack of respect for authority is not merely 
directed at chiefs but often existing political institutions. In Nigeria, both the 
post-colonial state and the pre-colonial chiefs seem to have lost their 
legitimacy among these young groups. 
 
As an interesting aside, the author – herself the founder of an NGO often 
under attack from the vigilante groups – questions the donor/NGO strategy of 
participation and empowerment. The young unemployed men are exactly 
those people that empowerment programmes in the area seek to assist, but it 
seems that once they get power, it is abused. 
 
 
 
  
 
2 Interestingly, in South Africa, under aparthaid many traditional leaders were seen as tools of 
the white regime but have managed to maintain legitimacy, respect and authority in the post-
apartheid era. 
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South Africa 
 
B. Oomen, ‘Group rights in post-apartheid South Africa: the 
case of the traditional leaders’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, No.44, pp.73-104, 1993 
 
South Africa’s first democratic constitution provides that the ‘institution, status 
and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised’. 
This recognition represents a continuation of former ‘native rule’ policies, but 
also represent a feature of the modern South African state. On the one hand, 
the recognition is linked to South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past, during 
which ethic identity was compartmentalised into ‘homelands’ with imported 
tribesmen and sometimes a false sense of ethnicity. On the other hand the 
recognition of chiefs does represent a desire to recognise cultural diversity 
and different norms of governance within South Africa, as well as the 
representation of minority political interests. 
 
Recognition in this way does, however, pose a series of problems: 
 
• How do you decide which groups need recognition? Inclusion and 
exclusion becomes a political issue when inclusion means separate 
legal rights. 
• Recognition of ‘traditional’ law frequently represents a questionable 
definition of customary practice based on anthropological assumptions. 
Traditional leadership is usually presented as an ‘age-old’ African 
tradition that may not actually be true, or that may be a 
misrepresentation of reality that leads to fuzzy legal frameworks based 
on ‘fuzzy logic’. 
 
 
B. Oomen, Tradition on the Move: Chiefs, Democracy and 
Change in Rural South Africa, Nederlands instituut voor 
Zuidelijk Afrika (NiZA), Cahier No. 6, Amsterdam, 2000, 
available at http://www.niza.nl/nl/publications/006/toc.htm. 
 
The introduction to this book looks at the nature of traditional authority in 
South Africa today, its relationship with local government and the judicial 
system and the issue of land.  
 
Traditional leaders might often look like the stereotype: grey-haired men in 
traditional dress, but there is some considerable diversity. There are both 
women and young men, ‘kitted out with cell-phones, Armani suits and stock-
options’. No matter what they look like though, all leaders work within 
traditional structures, including such bodies as tribal councils.  
 
These ‘traditional authorities’ have an often contentious relationship with local 
authorities, which the authors point out is known as ‘two bulls in a kraal’. 
 22 
Although local authorities were delegated distinct powers in 1994, older 
legislation giving similar powers to traditional authorities still applies. 
Traditional authorities still control offices, administrative staff and, importantly, 
communal land. Additionally, many rural people see the chief has the holding 
legitimate power and authority, rather than local government officials. 
Traditional authorities still often preside over customary courts, and the South 
African Law Commission has recommended that this continue, despite there 
being concerns over overly harsh punishments, irrational decisions and 
discrimination against women. 
 
 
B. Oomen, ‘”Walking in the middle of the road”: people’s 
perspectives on the legitimacy of traditional leadership in 
Sekhukhune, South Africa’, Paper presented at the seminar 
on ‘Popular Perspectives on Traditional Authority in South 
Africa’, African Studies Centre, Leiden, 17 January 2002, 
44pp, available at http://asc.leidenuniv.nl/pdf/walking.pdf. 
 
Oomen pioneered the questionnaire used here and by others, including 
Richard Thornton (see p. XX), to measure local people’s perspectives on 
traditional leaders. This paper begins with a series of quotes from her 
interviews that, besides making for interesting reading, provide important 
insights into the way people feel about both traditional leaders and local 
government. Traditional leaders are ‘part and parcel of our black culture…’ but 
are also ‘…just like us. They should go out and look for a job.’ ‘…[E]lected 
leaders seem to undermine the chiefs’. ‘All those people we elected never set 
foot in our village again afterwards. I’ll never vote again’.  
 
Quotes such as these support Oomen’s main findings: 
 
• Immaterial support for traditional leaders is high (80%!) but material 
support is limited (24%). By material support, she means payment 
of tribal levies or a traditional tribute such as sebego (home-brewed 
beer) or lehlakori (a special cut of beef). Many of the people who do 
pay this material support do not do so voluntarily and resent the fact 
that they have to pay it. This is why 68% of all those surveyed 
believe that the government should pay traditional leaders out of 
existing taxation.  
 
• Support is issue-related. People believe that traditional leaders 
should serve certain functions (e.g., settling disputes such as family 
matters, witchcraft, small theft and land issues), whereas other 
matters, such as large theft and maintenance cases, should go to 
the magistrate.  
 
• Support is not exclusive but exists jointly with support with other 
forms of authority. People see multiple forms of authority as 
providing ‘opportunities for forum-shopping and for holding more 
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institutions responsible for bringing development’. If the authorities 
could learn to cooperate, the logic goes, then there are more people 
to get things done.        
         
 Oomen asked further questions about the nature of government, 
asking who should provide democratic government, socio-economic 
development and services: the municipality, the chief, political 
parties, civil society or the central government. The central 
government ranked very low on these, despite being the only 
institution to provide roads, schools, water, electricity and telephone 
services.  Civil society ranked similarly low. In all three categories, 
political parties ranked the highest, followed closely by the chiefs 
and then much further behind by the municipality (although the 
municipality was closer in the expectation of provision of services) 
(see Thornton, p. XX, for similar findings in a different part of South 
Africa).  
 
• Support is dynamic, changing over time. Depending on 
performance, support for traditional leaders can rise or wane. One 
thing that does seem certain, for now anyway, is that in general 
people feel that traditional leaders ‘provide a sense of identity in a 
fast-changing world’.  
 
Oomen also provides a breakdown of her findings in terms of different kinds of 
communities. Although these should not be surprising, they are of particular 
importance to policy makers. The three communities surveyed included 
Hoepakranz, an isolated village of 500 high in the mountains; Ga-Masha, a 
poverty-stricken virtual shanty town of 5,000; and Mamone, a flourishing 
township of 40,000. 
 
• Hoepakranz: Support for traditional leaders here is the highest 
(94%), with 69% not even having heard of the local council. 87% 
rank the performance of the traditional leadership as ‘good’ or ‘very 
good’. The village is very remote, and no government vehicle has 
ever come up the mountain path. Only migrant workers who leave 
the village and come back have contact with the government. 
Without traditional leaders, people believe there would be no 
government at all. Despite this, people are very open to the notion 
of development and yearn to be part of the wider community, 
including other forms of authority. 
 
• Ga-Masha: Although 82% support the idea of traditional leadership, 
only 39% rank its performance as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, and only 
56% thinks it should have a future. People here seem to support 
traditional leaders not because they’ve done well but because the 
local government has done such a bad job: 76% have heard of the 
local council and 81% of these rate its performance poorly. Were 
this performance to improve, it is very likely that support for 
traditional leaders would subsequently decline. 
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• Mamone: This is exactly what has happened in Mamone. Only 68% 
have heard of their local council, but of these 54% feel that their 
standard of living has improved thanks to improved services 
provided by the government. Consequently, support for traditional 
leadership is lowest, at 73%, and the main reason for this support 
appears to be its link to culture and tradition. In an area of rapid 
change, it seems to provide people a link to their unique identity.  It 
is important to note though that this does not appear to be the case 
with the under-30s, and it is unclear what will be the implication of 
this demographic anomaly in the future. 
 
 
J.B. Peires, ‘Traditional Leaders in Purgatory: Local 
Government in Tsolo, Qumbu and Port St Johns, 1990-2000, 
African Studies, 59, 1, 2000 
 
This paper seeks to clarify the situation in which traditional leaders of the 
Eastern Cape have found themselves. Essentially they have been faced with 
four problems: 
 
• An erosion of their traditional power base and encroachment of 
national law, in particular the appointment of independent magistrates, 
undermining the powers of village headship enjoyed under the Native 
Administration Act 
• The development of the new model of rural local government 
introduced in 1995, which effectively moved the control of service 
provision and development projects to, what the author terms 
‘dubiously elected councillors’. 
• An upsurge in violence from May 1998 caused by stock theft, 
experiencing an escalation after the formation of vigilante groups, and 
criminality that could not be stopped by traditional leaders 
• A conflict between traditional leadership and elected councillors, won, 
eventually, by the councillors 
 
The paper concludes that the power of traditional leaders in the Transkei has 
deteriorated significantly in terms of formal power, but the chiefs remain a 
powerful local force, and a moral one.  
 
Despite the issues raised above, the prospects for traditional leaders are 
positive, largely due to their continued and constant presence in the local 
communities and their continued legitimacy amongst local inhabitants. The 
real challenge is to try to incorporate traditional leaders into democratic 
institutions. 
 
 
R. Thornton, ‘”Traditional Authority” and Governance in the 
Emjindini Royal Swazi Chiefdom, Barberton, Mpumalanga: An 
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empirical study’, January 2002, 28pp, available at 
http://asc.leidenuniv.nl/pdf/swazianaly.pdf. 
 
This empirical study uses a questionnaire to determine level of support for 
both the local chief and the municipality, with very interesting outcomes. The 
Emjindini Chiefdom lies next to the northern border of Swaziland and claims 
to include both the rural ‘Landgoed’ and the township of Barberton. The 
current chief is paid by the South African government but considers the Swazi 
king as its head. This trans-national identity, though not unusual, lacks 
constitutional legitimacy, as do chiefs throughout South Africa. Chiefs are 
expected to represent their communities and provide cultural guidance but do 
not have political or administrative powers. 
 
Despite this lack of legitimacy, 43% of respondents support the current chief, 
and 52% support the institution of chieftainship. Surprisingly, the support for 
the chief is 85% in the municipal-run township, where only 31% supported the 
municipal government. This is despite the fact that the chief provides no 
discernible goods or services and few respondents actually knew what he 
should do for them. The majority of those who did not register support for the 
chief or the institution seemed to be adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude rather 
than disapproval. Furthermore, the team could not find any particular factor to 
determine support or disapproval for either the chief or the municipal 
government – age, sex, education, religion, ethnicity and so on. Instead it 
appears to be down to ‘some unknown “political” factor’, just like support for 
the ANC despite disapproval of its performance in government. 
 
The team asked further questions about the nature of government, asking 
who should provide democratic government, socio-economic development 
and services: the municipality, the chief, political parties, civil society or the 
central government. The central government ranked very low on these, 
despite being the only institution to provide roads, schools, water, electricity 
and telephone services.  Civil society ranked similarly low. In all three 
categories, political parties ranked the highest, followed closely by the chiefs 
and then much further behind by the municipality (although the municipality 
was closer in the expectation of provision of services) (see Oomen, p. XX, for 
similar findings in a different part of South Africa).  
 
Despite the fact that both the central and municipal governments have 
constitutional legitimacy that the chief lacks and provide services, especially in 
the township, that the chief does not, people expect that the chief will play an 
important role in government and in service provision. This seems to be linked 
to the fungibility of political culture, a perception of ‘distance’ from the 
government, even at the local level, a belief that the chief represents ‘real’ 
African traditions and identities and the idea that governments come and go 
but ‘”the chief is always here”’. 
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Zimbabwe 
 
M.L. Daneel, ‘Environmental Reform: A New Venture of 
Zimbabwe’s Traditional Custodians of the Land’, Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law: Special Issue on The New 
Relevance of Traditional Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37-38, 
1996, 29pp, pp. 347-376. 
 
In Zimbabwe, as in many places, chiefs have a connection to the land in the 
eyes of the public, and are often seen as the traditional custodians of the land. 
They protect the land through upholding the ancestral rest-day, which protects 
soil fertility; preparing rain rituals; get divine environmental protection through 
the animals, which protects species diversity; and finally, preserving holy 
groves, which contain the majority of intact closed canopy forests in the 
country.  
 
The colonial government took some of this traditional land and gave it to white 
settlers (46.5%), alienating some chiefs from their holy groves. The first 
government after independence further stripped chiefs’ rights, allowing them 
only to arbitrate on domestic disputes and sit on village development 
committees, and did not recognise their ‘mystically derived environmental 
authority’. Because of this, the chiefs were unable to stop the land abuse and 
deforestation that characterised the post-independence years. The 
government has since begun giving some powers back to the chiefs, and 
through the creation of the Association of Zimbabwean Traditional Ecologists 
(AZTREC), chiefs have been able to reassert some control over traditional 
lands, focusing on afforestation, protection of water resources and wildlife 
conservation. At the same time, chiefs are able to gain government and 
national recognition for their activities. AZTREC has been very successful in 
achieving their aims. As of this publication, they have planted over 2 million 
trees, brought attention for the need for harmony with nature, provided a 
forum for public confessions of guilt about environmental destruction (on 
behalf of local people), promoted cooperation between chiefs and local 
government officials, protected water resources and helped provide adequate 
game management on communal lands. Despite this, Daneel points out that, 
as is often the case throughout Africa, donor and NGO funded projects rarely 
include chiefs or traditional leaders in their environmental work, and the 
Zimbabwean case is no exception.  
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